Iran is weak and wounded. Now’s the time to ratchet up pressure.
After four years of the Biden administration trying — and failing — to sweeten the world’s foremost sponsor of terror into good behavior, the Trump administration’s shift back to maximum pressure on Iran is a welcome change.
And a timely one. Tehran is in weak standing with the Iranian public. Its “axis of resistance” has been weakened by war with Israel. By returning to a tough sanctions policy that has zero tolerance for a nuclear weapon or Iran’s regional meddling, the Trump administration can deal a strong blow to the Islamic Republic.
But just declaring maximum pressure doesn’t mean it will come about. Achieving the big picture comes down to honing the small details, which, so far, still need to be fleshed out.
In a memo released in February, President Trump instructed various agencies to return to his first administration’s policy of strict sanctions enforcement against the Iranian regime. The most crippling of these is on oil exports, which rose dramatically under the Biden administration, despite largely having the same oil sanctions on the books.
That makes Trump’s work all the more difficult. “[Former president Joe] Biden non-enforcement and lifting of sanctions means that Iran has a buffer of more than $100 billion that it did not have as Trump’s first term wound down,” Michael Rubin, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, told me. “Maximum pressure might work, but it will take a bit longer.”
And it worked with other adversaries. Biden sat back while Iran sent ballistics to Russia for its ongoing conflict against Ukraine. And then there’s China, which from 2019 to 2023 doubled its import of crude oil and condensate from Iran.
Trump is choosing to take Iran at face value and raise the cost of its inevitable bad behavior. In his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that any concessions made to Iran will be used “as they have used in the past” — to build weapons and fund terror.
Trump’s return to maximum pressure isn’t just pragmatic, it’s good timing.
Militarily, morale — and coffers — are strained from Iran proxies' conflicts with Israel in Gaza and Lebanon. Iranian smuggling routes to proxies like Hezbollah have been obstructed by regime change in Syria.
Economically, the Iranian people are clear-eyed about where the blame lies for a struggling economy. More than three-quarters of Iranians blame their country’s foreign policy for economic troubles. Nearly 70 percent support normalization with the US. Iranians, especially downtrodden women, are frustrated with their government. And the less money the mullahs have to keep everyone in line, the harder it is to prop up the regime.
“[Supreme Leader Ali] Khamenei is now 85 years old. Smooth transitions cost money. What’s at stake now isn’t just Iran’s nuclear program, but the regime itself,” Rubin said.
In the international community, Trump has more leverage to trigger a “snapback” to pre-2015 multilateral sanctions on Iran. Snapback is defined in the Obama-era Iran Deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as a recourse to Iranian violations of the deal, which are well-documented. Since Trump’s exit from the deal in 2018, US attempts to trigger snapback have failed — but so have European efforts to resurrect another deal. As the October expiration date looms for the JCPOA, the European signatories — France, Germany, and the United Kingdom — would be foolish to choose a nuclear Iran over working with Trump, no matter how frustrated they are with him.
Still, good timing can be squandered by poor execution. For Team Trump to succeed on maximum pressure, it’s going to be about defining some key details in its posture toward Iran.
Trump has proclaimed that various agencies need to start enforcing sanctions again. Great. But what comes next, and how quickly? Will he roll out sanctions in phases, as he did in his first term, or all at once. “If you do it very slowly, kind of like the way the Biden administration dealt with Russia sanctions, you allow the adversary the ability to adapt over time,” Behnam Ben Taleblu, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told me. Iranians are masters at creating “resistance economies” that skirt Western sanctions.
Crucial strategic questions remain unanswered, too.
For example, what would the United States do if Iran, with its back against the wall, decided to fully pursue a nuclear weapon as a last-ditch option? Israel has been clear: It will not allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. Will the United States give its ally the tools it takes — and the green light — to take out nuclear sites if the time comes?
Strategic continuity across foreign policy matters, too. Russia is a vital military and economic partner with Iran — will making a soft deal with Vladimir Putin blunt maximum pressure’s impact? Will it scare off bipartisan support? Representative Jake Auchincloss of Massachusetts told me he believes Democrats “should agree” with maximum pressure, but he also said that if the administration is weak on Russia, “they are also, by extension, weaker on Iran.”
Trump, a dealmaker and opportunist more than a statesman, might also shrug off his more hawkish Middle East advisers and just pursue a deal that would appease the isolationists. Will his advisers have the backbone to stand up to him if he chooses political expediency over strategic necessity?
“I think Iran would love to make a deal and I would love to make a deal with them without bombing them,” Trump said in a recent interview. But getting hopes up for a deal can backfire. After Trump reached out to Khamenei earlier this month, the Iranians ignored the request and announced nuclear talks with China and Russia.
Putting a deal on the table signals to Iran‘s leaders there’s room for negotiation — but they should be sweating, not scheming. Between Israel’s offensive, the incoming sanctions, and Trump’s resolve to forge partnerships with Iranian adversaries in the Middle East, the United States has the upper hand and should keep it that way.
That Trump has declared a strong policy against Iran is a good step, especially after four years of Biden appeasement. But true maximum pressure comes from having a consistent, detailed policy.
By: Carine Hajjar
Source: Boston Globe